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REGULATORY REFORM AND BUREAUCRACY IN SOUTHEAST
ASIA: VARIATIONS AND CONSEQUENCES
David S. Jones
ABSTRACT
Reform of government regulation of private business has been considered a cornerstone
of good governance and   a necessary condition for  economic growth.  Part of
regulatory reform is reducing and streamlining administrative or procedural
regulations imposed on  business by government bureaucracies. Such regulations
impose burdens on  firms in terms of the time and effort  required to file forms, delays in
processing documents and applications and in  granting approvals, transactional costs
if charges are levied, and  obstacles resulting from arbitrary decisions by government
officials during the process. The article will consider the burdens on business caused by
regulatory procedures imposed by bureaucracy in the countries of Southeast Asia, and
how the reform of such procedures has  varied across region, with a particular focus on
certain key business functions, viz. starting a business, importing and exporting, paying
taxes, and constructing a commercial building. The article will posit explanations of
why such variation exists and will discuss links between reform of regulatory
procedures and the level of social and economic development of a country.  In
conclusion, the scope for reform of regulatory procedures in those countries where they
remain especially burdensome, will be examined, with consideration given to what
reforms are necessary and feasible.
INTRODUCTION
The regulation of private business by the state involves imposing restrictions and
compulsions on businesses to protect the public from the perceived social and economic
harm of the free market such as negative externalities, informational imbalances and
anti-competitive behavior (market failure). Examples, to name but a few, are price
controls, trade permits, zoning restrictions, restrictions on lending, regulations to reduce
pollution, and work safety stipulations (Baldwin & Cave, 1999, 9-17).  Alongside such
regulations (which may be referred to as substantive regulations), businesses are often
obliged to follow a chain of bureaucratic procedural requirements in relation to key
functions they undertake (administrative or procedural regulations), in some cases to
determine compliance with a substantive regulation.  Such procedural regulations may
themselves create obstacles and inconvenience for businesses, and so contribute to their
overall regulatory burden.
In recent years, it has been recognized that regulatory reform is crucial to economic and
social development and a hallmark of good governance, not least in Southeast Asia.
Regulatory reform involves: a) reducing the number of substantive regulations which
impede business activity with no substantial benefit to the public or the economy
(deregulation); b) creating   new regulations which are beneficial to the public and the
economy (reregulation). Equally important, regulatory reform necessitates streamlining
the procedures and reducing the red tape which exist alongside and sometimes in
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conjunction with a substantive regulation as mentioned above (procedural or
administrative deregulation). This leads to a more efficient and less burdensome
application of the procedural regulations, reducing the amount of time and effort
business managers have to spend in ensuring compliance, avoiding undue delays in
carrying out key business functions, and lowering the costs in the form of compulsory
payments to be made in following the required procedures (Baldwin & Cave, 1999, 81,
82, 85; Hafeez,  2003,  5-8; OECD, 1997; Hopkins, 1992; Khan, 2000,  7). Linked to
administrative deregulation are also reforms to make bureaucratic procedures clearer
and more transparent, so reducing the discretionary and arbitrary power of officials.
In the last 10 to 15 years, as part of the policy to reform regulatory systems in Southeast
Asia,  reform  of  administrative  procedures    has  also   been  undertaken.  However,  the
extent of reform has varied across the region. Some countries have significantly
streamlined procedures, reducing red tape, and cutting compliance costs, whilst
ensuring that the procedures which remain are clear and transparent.  Other countries by
contrast have only taken initial steps to reform regulatory procedures, leaving scope for
more far-reaching reforms.  The article will examine the extent of the regulatory burden
arising from bureaucratic processes affecting key business functions in the countries of
Southeast  Asia.  It  will  distinguish   those  countries  where  major  reform  of  procedural
regulations has occurred from those where it has not. The article will consider why such
variation exists and how it corresponds with differences in social and economic
development of Southeast Asian states. In conclusion, the scope for reform of regulatory
procedures in those countries where they remain numerous and unwieldy, will be
examined, with consideration given to what reforms are necessary and feasible. Part of
the evidence on regulatory procedures will be taken from the World Bank’s database on
regulations and its yearly surveys, Doing Business.
THE EXTENT AND BURDEN OF ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION
As part of the regulatory framework imposed by the state, businesses are obliged to
adhere to a set of  bureaucratic procedural requirements in respect of their key
functions. – submitting forms and certificates to regulatory, licensing and other public
authorities, undergoing inspections and valuations,  and obtaining  approvals from the
authorities mentioned above  (comprising licenses, permits, certificates, registrations
and signatures). Some of the procedures are little more than formalities involving no
major decisions though they can be time consuming and costly. Other procedures exist
in order to determine if certain conditions have been fulfilled and may result in an
application being rejected, an approval withheld, or an inspection test being failed.
Such procedures are more than formalities and entail decisions by officials that affect
the business. This is particularly so, as pointed out below, if procedures are unclear and
opaque (Hafeez, 2003, 7).
The extent to which private firms are subject to procedural regulation can be measured
in  various ways depending upon the business activities being regulated. Common to
most  of  them  is  the  total  list  of  steps  involved:   the  number  of  procedures  to  be
followed,   documents  and  forms  to  be  completed  and  submitted,  approvals   to  be
obtained, and inspections and valuations to be undertaken. A second common measure
is the time taken for these activities to be completed whilst a third are the costs which
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arise  as  a  result  of  the  fees  and  charges  levied  for  any  of  these  requirements.   Using
these measures, the extent and burden of procedural regulation in the various countries
of Southeast Asia can be gauged.
The chain of bureaucratic procedures that must be followed to enable a business
function to be undertaken or to ensure that conditions mandated by a substantive
regulation have been met can readily add to the burdens of a business,  if unduly
cumbersome and inefficiently administered.  The procedures can encroach upon the
time of business managers (such as the hours and days spent in obtaining advice,
completing forms, submitting documents and visiting government departments), which
increases if the services of notaries and lawyers are required. In addition, costs have to
be borne if charges are levied for processing applications and paperwork, verifying
documents, and undergoing inspections and valuations,  with extra expenses   if notaries
and lawyers are engaged.  Serious delays may occur in consequence of the time taken
by regulatory, licensing and other public authorities in undertaking the required
procedures. If complex and numerous, becoming a drain upon the time of managers,
imposing extra costs, and creating undue delays, they may serve to prevent or
discourage engagement in business activities. The upshot is to make businesses less
efficient, competitive and profitable, with, what’s more, significant disincentives to
undertake further  investment and expand the scale of operations.
A further concern is that administrative regulations, which otherwise should be
straightforward, are not so due to their  ambiguity.  This allows officials of the relevant
agency  discretion to determine the conditions and actions required in following  a
procedure as well as the charges to be levied. Given the ambiguity, such discretion may
be exercised arbitrarily to  restrict or prohibit a business activity.  To make matters
worse, firms  may not always be aware of  how an unclear procedural regulation is
interpreted, thereby increasing the chances of  not meeting the conditions and
completing the paperwork  in accordance with the stipulations  of  the agency.
By way of example, the nature and consequences of  unclear and opaque procedures in
Vietnam have been repeatedly   expressed by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and
Industry in recent years through  its regular bulletin. In one issue in 2006, it stated  that
“the decision to grant a  license is heavily subject  to the judgment of officials which
increases the prospect for discretion”  as result of the fact that  “the criteria to grant a
license  are  unclear.” If an application is rejected, “the reasons given for refusal are
unsubstantiated” (Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry [VCCI], 2006a,  1).  In
the same vein, one Vietnamese bank official has pointed out  the impact on businesses
which, in trying to  comply with administrative requirements, “are hassled or may be
required by the licensing authorities to meet many other arbitrary conditions,” and in
consequence “may have to give up business opportunities” (VCCI, 2006a,  2). These
observations  are fairly typical of the business regulatory system of several countries in
the region.
Thus,  a key challenge facing governments in Southeast Asia  is, alongside  lessening
unnecessary substantive regulations,  to pursue administrative deregulation as well, so
as reduce and simplify  the lengthy and complex bureaucratic  processes which
businesses must follow. Equally important is to make regulatory procedures clearer and
their application more transparent so as to reduce the arbitrary control of regulatory and
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licensing authorities.   However, in Southeast Asia,  considerable differences remain in
the extent to which states have undertaken reform of bureaucratic processes affecting
businesses. This can be exemplified in four   areas of business activity, as discussed
below: starting a business,  importing and exporting goods,  paying taxes, and
constructing a commercial building.
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS IN KEY ASPECTS OF BUSINESS  IN
SOUTHEAST ASIAN STATES
Starting a business
A key stage in business activity which is subject to administrative regulation is the
setting up of an enterprise, the central requirement of which is its  registration  with its
name and description entered into an official business registry. This is necessary,
amongst  other  things,   to  accord  the  business  legal  status,  to  enable  it  to  export  and
import goods, to obtain  credit and acquire property, to facilitate the  payment of taxes,
to ensure proper enforcement of contracts, and to protect employees’ rights (World
Bank [WB], 2006a,  9-14). As shown in Table 1, in several countries of Southeast Asia,
the procedural requirements in setting up a business are unwieldy,  protracted and costly
whilst in others the process has been reformed with the streamlining of procedures,
which have become as a result   more expeditious and less costly (Djankov et al, 2002,
1-37; Fonesca et al, 2001,  692-705).
 The bureaucratic process for setting up a business in Indonesia is one of the most
cumbersome and protracted in the region. 12 procedures must be followed before a
company can become legally operational. The first of these  is to ensure  that another
company is not using the same name. The standard form of the company deed must be
obtained from the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. After completion, it must then
be verified by and submitted through a notary, in order to secure clearance for  the
company's name by  the Ministry. Once this is done, the company can then reserve the
name  for  itself.  The  next  step  is   for  the  company  founder  to  sign  the deed of
establishment before a notary, after which the company is obliged  to apply for and
obtain a  taxpayer’s registration number, a VAT collector number, and an entrepreneur
tax identification number if it is a large company. Following this, the firm is required to
obtain a  domicile certificate from the local or municipal authority, and to open a bank
account in the company’s name with a deposit of  the paid up capital reserve stipulated
for a new business together with the submission to the bank of  the company's articles of
association and copies of ID cards of the proposed authorized signatories. Only after a
bank account has been opened, with the requisite paid up capital, and a tax code
number created, can the company apply for the approval of the deeds of establishment
from the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights. After  approval is given,  the company
can seek to be registered on the Company Register at the Ministry  of Industry and
Trade,  and, providing there is no objection, it may then   receive  a business registration
certificate (WB, 2006a; 2007).
Following registration, several important post-registration procedures must be followed.
If the company is a non-facility trading company it must obtain a trading license also
from  the  Ministry   of  Industry  and  Trade.  If  the  company  employs  more  than  10
employees and/or has a payroll bill of Rp1 million per month, it must next register with
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the  Ministry  of  Manpower  and  then   subscribe   to  the   social  security  scheme  for  its
employees (WB, 2007).
According  to  the   World  Bank’s   survey, Doing Business 2006, the  time taken in
Indonesia to complete the administrative process described above, is estimated to range
from 97 to  151 days. The period needed by the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights
to grant  approval for the deeds of establishment in itself  is estimated at 22 days.  The
processes of business registration, tax registration, issue of a trading license, and
registration with Ministry of Manpower each takes  14-15 days (WB, 2007).
In Vietnam,  a start was made in 1999 to reducing bureaucratic  procedures  in starting a
business as a result of the  introduction of the Enterprise Law. This in part contributed
to a surge in businesses entering the market. However, much remains to be done to fully
streamline  the  business  start-up  process,  despite  the  creation  of  the  one  stop  shop
arrangement as discussed below.   The World Bank survey, Doing Business 2006,
showed that there were  11 procedures which take on average 50 days with  charges
levied amounting to 51% of annual income per head.  These must be followed
sequentially and involve 3 departments: Department of Planning and Investment,
Department of Public Security, and the  Tax Department.  According to another survey,
establishing a business can take anything up to 260 days involving 13 procedures. The
survey  concluded that “administrative procedures (relating to a business start-up) are
still the biggest barriers to an entrepreneur’s chances of turning a business idea into a
reality” (GTZ-CIEM, 2005; WB, 2006a,  13). These  views have been repeatedly
echoed by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and local and foreign
business managers. Illustrating the time wasted by business owners  in meeting their
procedural obligations  when setting up a business, Van Quang Thinh of the Managing
Consulting Group of Vietnam,  stated in 2006:
In some provinces we have worked in, a person starting a business has to visit his local
administrative authorities at least 13 times to complete the first three business
establishment procedures. In one province, the staff of the relevant administrative
agencies  spend 27 days over 98 operational steps to process a business establishment
application…. As a result business owners have to run around to fulfill several
complicated procedures (VCCI, 2006b, 2).
Reflecting further the frustration of the business community at the impingements of
petty officialdom, another business manager, Nguyen Anh Tuan of  Bizconsult, referred
to the way officials responsible for business registration “refuse to accept an application
if minor information is missing. In many cases businesses have to wait seven days to be
informed of just one minor mistake” (VCCI, 2006b, 2).
Cambodian entrepreneurs when starting a business  too suffer from  a surfeit of
bureaucratic controls, which the government has pledged to eliminate (12 procedures
must be followed with costs amounting to 173% of average income) (IMF, 2004a,  72).
In Laos,  when establishing  a business 9  procedures are mandatory  which costs the
entrepreneur an amount equivalent to 15% of average income, and are  the most
protracted in Southeast Asia for business start ups extending over 198 days.  On a
brighter note, the World Bank’s 2007 preliminary report on Doing Business has
indicated the beginning of attempts in Laos to reduce the bureaucratic  hurdles to
market entry, although further and far-reaching reform is necessary (WB, 2006b, 4).
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By contrast, in Singapore the number of procedures in starting a business is only 6, each
taking one day at a cost of  US$229, less than  1% of average income. This equates with
the average number of procedures in starting a business in OECD countries, which,
however, require a longer time span (16 days) and greater cost (5% of average income)
(World Bank, 2007; 2006a,  150). The approval of articles of association, and business
registration with  the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority of Singapore
(which was created in 2005 and incorporated the  functions of the old Registry of
Companies and Businesses)  are compounded into one procedure taking  about 3 days
and are done on-line. Under the Companies (Amendment) Act, 2002,  and Business
Registration (Amendment) Act, 2002,  the Registrar of Companies and Businesses  no
longer undertakes a pre-registration check for similar names. Under the same
legislation,   the applicant for registration  need not submit any hardcopy forms,
declarations and affidavits., nor will he/she be issued with a hard copy certificate of
registration (Republic of Singapore, 2002a, ss. 8, 11; 2002b, ss. 7, 8. 16, 19, 14). As Lee
Hsien Long, the Minister for Finance, when introducing the second reading of the
Business Registration (Amendment) Bill, stated:
The proposed amendments in this Bill are expected to benefit business owners in terms
of lower costs, more efficient service and greater convenience. It would also align
RCB's  (Registry  of  Companies  and  Businesses)  practices  with  its  counterparts  in  the
US, UK and Australia, and allow RCB  to provide better service to its customers
(Singapore Parliament [SP], 2002, cols. 55, 65, 66).
This has been made possible by an on-line facility  known as BizFile created in 2002,
by which all company submissions,  registrations, certifications, and declarations are
undertaken electronically. One advantage is to allow businesses, according to Lee Hsien
Loong,   “same day incorporation, which has become the service standards that
businessmen would expect” and “simplifies the filing and incorporation process” (SP,
2002, col. 59).
Source: World Bank, 2007. The World Bank survey does not include Myanmar and
Brunei.
The post registration procedures consist only of registering  with the Inland Revenue
Authority of Singapore (with respect to all taxes levied on the company and its
employees) and Central Provident Fund Board, and  subscribing to the  Workmen’s
Compensation Insurance. These are undertaken on-line and  each takes only one day. It
may be noted that several of the procedures that are mandatory in Indonesia are either
eliminated or undertaken simultaneously in Singapore. Retaining only necessary
procedures, combining  procedures,  and using on-line facilities for every stage of the
Table 1.   Starting a business
No of procedures Time taken (days) Costs (% of income per head)
Cambodia 12 37 173
Indonesia 12 151 102
Laos 9 198 15
Malaysia 9 30 30.5
Philippines 11 48 20
Singapore 6 6 1
Thailand 8 33 6
Vietnam 11 50 51
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process in starting an enterprise   significantly enhances the efficiency of the process,
minimizes the number of days required, and involves little cost.
External trade
Importing and exporting goods in many states is subject to  regulation, consisting of
restrictions on what goods can be imported and exported (either through prohibition or
quota restriction), and customs and other duties levied on them. Accompanying these
restrictions   are  the  procedures   that  must  be  followed  to  obtain  an  import  or  export
permit and to clear customs. Various documents must be submitted identifying and
describing the goods, including   their volume and  value,  and   specifying  countries of
origin and destination (WB, 2006a, 53-59). This  may require verification through
inspections and valuations at the seaport, airport and border crossing, giving rise to
further  paperwork  and  administration.   Table  2  shows  how  much  the  countries  of
Southeast Asia have varied in reducing and streamlining administrative requirements
relating to the issue of import and export permits and the clearance of customs, and the
consequences in terms of  costs and time.
Importers and exporters in Cambodia encounter  a high degree of government
bureaucracy in relation to trade permits and customs levies and clearance, resulting  in
serious delays (which is only exceeded in  Laos  where the situation is distorted by the
fact that it is landlocked and extra paperwork and approvals are required for
transshipment). In Cambodia,  8 documents have to be processed to allow   goods to be
exported and 12  to allow goods to be  imported, necessitating   respectively 10 and 18
approvals and taking 43 and 55 days (WB, 2007). The IMF has brought attention to
these impediments to the facilitation of trade in Cambodia.  In a recent study,  it  noted
that  “trade facilitation practices stand out as having high official and unofficial costs,”
and lead to “delays, uncertainty and discretion for clearance procedures”(IMF 2004a,
49).  This  has  contributed  significantly  to  the  “excess  transaction  costs  (in  time  and
money)” which overall Cambodian firms incur in dealing with government agencies.  In
response, the Cambodian government is currently focusing on  reforms “to modernize
and streamline customs procedures …  to enhance trade facilitation.” The priority is
centered on   “decreasing the total import and export transaction costs [and]  decreasing
the overall time it takes to import and export products” (IMF, 2004a, 70; IMF, 2004b,
24).
Philippines has in recent years significantly  streamlined the procedures governing
import permits and customs clearance. Contributing to this was the recent introduction
of  transactional valuations (the price paid by the importer to the exporter plus handling
and shipment costs), rather  than the valuations undertaken by the customs authorities
themselves, the ending of  pre-shipment inspections at the country of origin, the use of
customs and permit  audits of goods on a selective basis and only after they have
reached  the  importer  (known  as  back-end  audits).  This,  together  with  the  adoption  of
on-line  permit  and  customs  clearance,   cuts  down  the  documents  that  have  to  be
submitted, reduces the delay in securing clearance and costs incurred in obtaining
permits (Clarete, 2004).
Singapore is exemplary   in having adopted an  effective system to  facilitate  trade,
partly attributed to minimizing administrative requirements for imports and exports. 5
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documents are necessary for imports and 6  for exports, with 2 signatures of approval in
each case; the entire process taking only 3-6 days.  The documents  are a bill of lading,
cargo manifest, packing list,  commercial invoice,  certificate of origin (for imports),
customs export declaration form and shipping note (the last two for exports). The
administrative process compares favorably with that in OECD countries. The number of
documents is similar to the average total  needed in foreign  trading in  OECD countries,
but the time taken up for processing is much less and the processing costs are  more
than a half (WB, 2007; WB, 2006a, 150).
Table 2.  Regulatory process for importing  and exporting
Number of documents to be
submitted for permit and
customs
Number of  signatures needed
before  issue  of  permit and
customs clearance
Time taken to obtain
permits and  clearance
(days)
Export Import Export Import Export Import
Cambodia 8 12 10 18 43 55
Indonesia 7 10 3 6 25 30
Laos 12 16 17 28 66 78
Malaysia 6 12 3 5 20 22
Philippines 6 8 5 7 19 22
Singapore 5 6 2 2 6 8
Thailand 9 14 10 10 23 25
Vietnam 6 9 12 15 35 36
Source: World Bank, 2007.
Paying taxes
Part of the regulatory framework are the tax obligations imposed on businesses, the bulk
of which comprise corporate tax, sales and value added taxes withheld from the
consumer but paid by  businesses, social security contributions and property tax. The
focus here is not on the amount of  tax that has to be paid by a business but on the
procedural burden that falls on firms in meeting their tax obligations. This is reflected in
the total of tax payments a firm  is required  to make, which  is determined both by the
number of taxes levied and also the number of times payment must be made during the
year.  Equally important is the amount of time businesses have to put aside to prepare,
file and pay (or withhold) taxes. Preparation time includes the hours spent  to collect all
information necessary to compute the tax payable. This includes time spent on  keeping
separate accounting books for tax purposes, completing all  the tax forms and making
all necessary calculations. Payment time is the hours needed to make the payment on-
line or at the tax office, and if the latter the waiting time when visiting a tax office (WB,
2006a,  45-52). The data on the number of tax payments required and time taken to file
tax returns in the various countries of Southeast Asia is given in Table 3.
The greatest number of  tax payment transactions are recorded in the Philippines and
Indonesia (more than 50), with Thailand and Malaysia also requiring large numbers of
tax payments from businesses. In terms of hours spent in collecting information and
filing returns visiting tax offices, the greatest burden falls on Vietnamese businesses
(over 1,000 hours per year) followed by Indonesia (just over 570 hours).  Again
Singapore stands out with relatively few tax payments (16), necessitating  only 30 hours
to be spent in collecting information and filing returns. The more streamlined procedure
and less time-consuming tasks in filing tax returns and making payments are partly the
product of a simplified business tax system and the extensive provision of on-line filing
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of tax returns and payment of tax liabilities.  The procedural requirements for tax
payment by businesses in Singapore is just slightly above the average for OECD
countries which is  15 procedures taking  203 hours (WB, 2006a,  129, 137,  146, 150,
155, 160).
In such countries as Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam, the administrative  burden
in making several  tax payments even for the same tax and spending time in collecting
records and completing returns,  falls heaviest  on small and medium enterprises, which
may not be conversant with all the minutiae of tax regulations and not  able to  hire tax
accountants or employ finance officers.
Table 3.   Regulatory process in paying taxes
No of
tax
payments
No of hours business
spent in filing tax
return
No of
tax
payments
No of hours business
spent in filing tax
return
Cambodia 27 121 Philippines 59 94
Indonesia 52 576 Singapore 16 30
Laos 31 180 Thailand 46 104
Malaysia 35 190 Vietnam 32 1,050
Source: World Bank, 2007.
Procedural  regulations in  constructing a commercial building
The construction industry is a sector  of the economy where regulation is an obvious
necessity. This is to ensure that a  building is sound and  durable and therefore is safe to
occupy and use, does not utilize excessive land space (where land is scarce), and
conforms with land zoning and environmental stipulations. As with other substantive
regulations,  bureaucratic procedures must be followed to ensure or determine
compliance (WB, 2006a,  15-20). As shown in Table 4, significant variations exist
across Southeast Asia in relation to the number and complexity of administrative
procedures imposed on the construction industry and the resultant transactional costs
and expenditure of time.
The  most   numerous  and    tortuous    procedures  are  recorded  in  Cambodia.  Here  28
must be completed before a building can become fully operational. To acquire a
building permit from  the municipal authority (for a smaller building), and the Ministry
of Land Management, Urban Planning, and Construction (for a larger one)  entails the
submission, review and approval of  11 documents at the commune (sangkat), district,
municipal  and  in  some  cases   central  government  levels.  9  of  these   are  the  building
plans for the different facets of the building  and site.  Once a permit has been granted,
the company must notify the district and sangkat authorities. At the completion of  the
different   stages in the process of construction, the company must inform the Ministry
so that  an inspection can be  undertaken (e.g. when the foundation works are completed
or the walls erected).  Altogether 7 inspections are carried  out.  Three further
inspections must be undertaken  before each of the main utility services are provided.
The time taken to process the documents  and give approvals  is estimated at 181 days.
It  takes  on  average  30  days  to  obtain  a  certificate  from  the  district  governor  prior  to
applying for a building permit, and another 30 days to obtain the  permit from the
municipal authority or from the Ministry. A further 56 days should be allowed before
electricity and other utility connections are made.  What’s more, the transactional costs
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incurred  are just over US$6,230 (most of which is the cost of acquiring the building
permit),  more  than  16  times   average  income  per  capita.  This  is  no  small  sum   for  a
small construction contractor struggling to get on his  feet.
In  several  other  Southeast  Asian  countries,  a   lengthy  and  similar  sequence  of
bureaucratic procedures has to be followed in the construction of a commercial building
– in Laos, Malaysia, Philippines and Indonesia, the number of procedures range
between 19 and 25. The time taken to complete these procedures ranges between 192
days (Laos) and 281 days (Malaysia).
In Singapore  and  Thailand, the bureaucratic system regulating the construction
industry is much less complex, more expeditious and significantly less costly. In
Thailand,  9 procedures have to be followed in the construction of a commercial
building, extending over 123 days with a cost of only 11% of average income, whilst in
Singapore there are 11 procedures taking 129 days at a cost of 22% of average income.
These figures are even slightly below the OECD average of 14 procedures in
constructing a commercial building taking 150 hours (WB, 2006a,  150, 155; 2007).
The difference between these two countries and Cambodia and other countries
characterized by complex, drawn out and costly procedures in the construction sector is
the minimal involvement or non-involvement of sub-national entities, and the absence
of repeat inspections at the different stages in the process of construction. In fact, once a
building permit has been granted, there is no inspection until the building is complete.
In other words,  the government agencies in Singapore and Thailand responsible for
construction matters do not engage in undue interference in a building project once it is
underway (although  in Singapore more emphasis is now given to work safety checks).
Table 4. Regulatory process  in  constructing a commercial building
Procedures Time (days) Cost (% of income per capita)
Cambodia 28 181 1,640
Indonesia 19 224 311
Laos 24 192 204
Malaysia 25 281 78
Philippines 23 197 113
Singapore 11 129 22
Thailand 9 127 11
Vietnam 14 133 56
Source: World Bank, 2007.
The overall scale of administrative regulations for business activities in Southeast Asian
states
The countries of the region may be divided into two groups in the extent to which
bureaucratic procedures impinge upon business activity. This may be adduced from the
World Bank’s governance indicator on regulatory quality, in part reflecting  procedural
regulations,  and the measure of red tape provided by Forbes Media. Both measures are
available  as  percentile  rankings  within  a   list  that   covers  nearly  all  countries,  which
are given in Table 5.
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In one group, consisting of Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Brunei,  bureaucratic
procedures and red tape have been significantly streamlined  with resultant reduction of
transaction costs and minimizing of delays, as well as restricting opportunities for
arbitrary decisions by officials.  In the other group, comprising Cambodia,  Indonesia,
Laos,  Myanmar, Philippines, and Vietnam, administrative  regulations remain
numerous and  burdensome, although limited and incipient  efforts have been made to
reduce bureaucratic requirements on businesses.   The worst examples are Myanmar
with  a   regulatory  quality  measure  at  the  2nd  percentile  and  Laos  with  a  red  tape
measure ranking   at the 1st percentile. In Cambodia which has a percentile rank of 11
for red tape, the World Bank  has reported that “the formal private sector faces a myriad
transaction costs and barriers to establishment and operation” (IMF, 2004a,  49, 69). In
Vietnam, which has higher percentile scores for both red tape and regulatory  quality,
bureaucratic procedures continue to seriously  hamper private firms, despite the
implementation of the one stop shop arrangement, as  discussed below. According to the
Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry in 2006, “the business community
considers the widespread use of increasing business licenses and conditions to be a
major  barrier  to  doing  business,  increasing  entry  and  operational  costs  as  well  as   the
freedom to do business.  Although many business licenses have been abolished,  a
number of new licenses have been issued and many abolished licenses reintroduced in a
different  form.”  (VCCI,  2006a,   1)  These  together  with  “a  large  volume  of  unwritten
conditions” have imposed “heavy burdens on businesses” (VCCI, 2006a,  1). The
tendency to reintroduce regulations  has been noted too  in a recent IMF survey of
Vietnam (IMF, 2006a,  66).  Even in the Philippines, with higher red tape and
regulatory quality percentile rankings than  the countries mentioned above, the
investment climate is considered by the IMF as being undermined by excessive
bureaucracy and   the need to address this issue through simplifying procedures has
been highlighted in the Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan, 2004-2010 (IMF,
2004c,  15, 20).
Table 5. Red tape and regulatory quality
Red tape:
percentile score
in 2006
Regulatory
quality:
percentile score
in 2005
Red tape:
percentile score
in 2006
Regulatory
quality percentile
score in 2005
Brunei N/A 77 Myanmar N/A 2
Cambodia 11 27 Philippines 34 52
Indonesia 4 37 Singapore 95 99
Laos 1 11 Thailand 65 64
Malaysia 71 67 Vietnam 31 26
Source: World Bank, 2006c; Forbes Media, 2006.
REASONS FOR THE FAILURE TO REFORM ADMINISTRATIVE
REGULATIONS
It is noticeable that in most  countries of Southeast Asia market reforms have been
implemented to liberalize their economies, providing more opportunities for the private
sector to expand. This has entailed, amongst other things,  removing restrictions   on
enterprise formation, especially in sectors where government monopolies had existed,
lessening controls over property acquisition,  reducing impediments to  foreign
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investment, and lowering trade barriers. Yet economic reform has in some cases not
been accompanied by a commensurate degree of reform of bureaucratic procedures
entailing reducing and simplifying  procedures and making them  more precise and
transparent.
Various reasons may be posited why reform of administrative  regulations  has not  kept
in step with economic deregulation.  The most significant is  bureaucratic self-interest,
measured in terms of power, private remuneration, agency budgets and jobs or career
opportunities  (Baldwin  &  Cave,  1999,   5-7).  Whilst   the   policy  to  lessen  or  abolish
direct economic restrictions  over business  is one decided by the government itself,
bureaucratic procedures  to which business must adhere, are a matter for government
administrators. The liberalization of  the economy allowing  the private sector to expand
and generate more wealth, represents a shift in the balance of power within the society.
The power of bureaucratic elites is, therefore,  increasingly rivaled by the rising
influence of  independent and  wealthy business leaders.  The continuation  or creation
of complex and ill-defined procedures entailing multiple approvals and inspections, and
allowing scope for arbitrary decisions,  helps bureaucratic elites  to retain some of their
power and status.
A further advantage to the bureaucrat is the opportunity for rent seeking. To expedite
otherwise protracted procedures, and to obtain a registration, license or permit,  or to
pass an inspection test  (which could  be refused or failed for  a purely technical or
minor  reason),  a  private  business  may  have  little  choice  but  to  resort  to  bribery.  It  is
noticeable how many procedures, identified in the World Bank survey Doing Business,
mentioned above,  necessitated “unofficial” payments, often determined by
“negotiation.” This occurred either when no official charge was levied  or as an addition
to an existing charge. Moreover,  when official charges were levied, part of the revenue
generated could be readily embezzled. For this reason, it was financially rewarding to
the bureaucracy to retain as many bureaucratic steps as possible in regulating different
aspects of  a business activity. Indonesia is an example, where illegal taxes and charges
have  to  be  paid  to  secure  both  central  and  local  government  approvals.  The  IMF  has
observed that “illegal fees are a major problem of doing business in Indonesia and
decentralization has exacerbated this problem.” Moreover, “extortion by customs and
tax officials is increasingly cited as a problem” (IMF, 2006b,  4; 2004d,  19).
Besides,  a plethora of  procedures necessitating a good deal of  time-consuming work
in processing documents, verifying records, conducting inspections and valuations,
issuing licenses, permits and certificates, hearing appeals etc., safeguards employment
in  government administration. The need for a management structure to supervise and
direct such work  and provide policy input, ensures possibilities of  career advancement.
In addition,  the manpower and resources needed to undertake the procedures mentioned
above  enables agencies to maximize  their budgets (Niskanen, 1971).
Another reason for the failure to reform  regulatory procedures  is the continuance of  a
traditional bureaucratic culture in several countries of Southeast Asia, which espouses
rules, procedures and paperwork, hierarchical control,  and  rigid divisions  of
responsibility. Such a traditional mind-set in ministries and other agencies of the state
bureaucracy responsible for regulation and licensing,   is often accompanied by  their
ability to pursue their own policies, independently  of the executive and legislature, as
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well as  the sovereign law.  The upshot is  that progress  in  lightening  the regulatory
burden upon business is frustrated despite the good intentions of government leaders.
An example is  the Task Force set up by the Vietnamese government in 2000 with the
remit   to radically   reduce bureaucratic control of the business sector. According to one
member:
The Task Force had to discuss the details of each and every term in the licenses with all
of the Ministries and try to convince them to cancel some terms, but in the end, most of
the Ministries did not agree. Ministries have great power and if they do not approve the
cancellation of licenses, ultimately the Task Force cannot do anything (VCCI, 2006a,
3).
The failure   to streamline and reduce  unnecessary  and cumbersome procedures that
regulate businesses may also be attributed to a lack of coordination and information
sharing amongst government agencies,  especially in the case of separate procedures
which require the same or overlapping information. This has meant that such procedures
have to be repeated time and again, which otherwise could be compounded into a single
procedure (de Sa, 2005,  13-16). An example are the various  procedures required in a
business start-up, the main ones being the approval of the articles  of association, the
registration  of  the   business,   tax  registration  and  issue  of  a  tax  code  number,    and
incorporation into employees’ social security scheme, all of which can be consolidated
into one procedure, as pointed out below (WB, 2006a, 9-14). Of course, it can be argued
that the impediment to coordination and information sharing is bureaucratic self-interest
mentioned above, since the number of tasks involved would decrease and with it  the
opportunities for rent seeking, the exercise of arbitrary power, and the reason to retain
jobs which otherwise would not be needed.
The lack of  reform   of regulatory procedures affecting business can also be attributed
to the decentralization of administration. In countries such as Cambodia, Indonesia,
Philippines, and Laos, regional, district and village authorities have become part of  the
chain of the procedures, partly as a way of assigning to them a role in matters affecting
local  interests  and  the  local  economy.  But  if  two,  or  as  in  some  cases  three  levels  of
government are involved,  the number of procedures is multiplied. In Cambodia, three
levels of government play a role in the building approval process significantly extending
the chain of procedures.   In Indonesia, 21 regulations related to the hiring of labor,
administered  by regional governments,  have been recently revoked by the Minister for
Internal Affairs because of the impediments to hiring they had created  (IMF, 2004e, 4).
THE LINK BETEEN REFORM OF ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS AND
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
By comparing the foregoing tables and table 6 below,  it can be adduced that the extent
of administrative regulation imposed on businesses, or conversely the extent of reform
to  reduce  and  simply  such  regulation,  varies  according  to  the  level  of   economic  and
social development of a country measured by the Human Development Index score, and
GDP  per  head  at  purchasing  power  parity  (PPP).  The  region  can  be  divided  into  two
groups according to these measures. As shown in Table 6, in the more developed  group
(comprising Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei and Singapore) , the HDI score  is above .75
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out of 1, and the GDP per head is above $8,000,  with  global rankings for each country
with respect to  both measures within the first 75 out of 177 countries. In these
countries, regulatory reform has been noticeable and  administrative regulations impose
at most  limited obstacles to business activity. The second and less developed group in
the region (comprising Myanmar, Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia and the
Philippines) is marked by HDI scores and GDP per head below (in some cases well
below) the thresholds indicated above. Here, business continues to be heavily regulated
by bureaucratic procedures with  only limited and halting progress in implementing
reform.  The distinction applies to both administrative regulation of specific aspects of
business activity, as shown in Tables 1-4 (e.g. forming a business and trading), and the
overall level of  administrative regulation and red tape as shown in Table 5.
Table 6. Measures of social and economic development of Southeast Asian states
HDI in 2006 GDP per head in 2006
Score (0-1) Ranking (out of 177
countries) *
US$ at PPP Ranking (out of 177
countries) *
Brunei .871 34 19,210 36
Cambodia .583 129 2,423 122
Indonesia .711 108 3,609 113
Laos .553 133 1,954 134
Malaysia .805 61 10,276 57
Myanmar .581 130 1,027 158
Philippines .763 84 4,614 100
Singapore .916 25 28,077 21
Thailand .784 74 8,090 65
Vietnam .709 109 2,745 118
* The ranking is in descending order so that the highest ranked country is 1 and the lowest is 177.
Source: UNDP, 2007.
Given the correspondence between the level of development and the reform of the
regulatory system which minimizes bureaucratic restrictions on business, the question
arises whether the former  is the determinant or consequence of the latter. The answer is
probably both.
On the one hand,  regulatory reform removes many of the bureaucratic impediments to
engaging in business activity and doing what is necessary to enable companies to grow
and become profitable. Owners and managers  are no longer faced with the difficulties
of dealing with numerous, complex and opaque procedures. Furthermore,  onerous
transactional costs and  protracted delays are avoided with less opportunity for
bureaucrats to make arbitrary  decisions that frustrate what businesses can do. This
ensures an environment much more conducive to business growth, employment
creation, and a wider public revenue base, leading to improved living standards and
public services.
On the other hand, it could be argued that regulatory reform that reduces bureaucratic
impediments is a consequence (and not just a determinant) of social and economic
development.  In the group of countries with a higher  HDI index score and GDP per
head, the business sector is already well established. Business leaders, occupying
positions of  influence, may more effectively  lobby policy makers to implement
measure that reduce and simplify administrative regulations. Moreover, policy makers
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themselves may pursue opportunities to build up their own business interests as owners,
shareholders and partners, and  therefore may become more sympathetic to calls for
deregulation.  Besides, the capital resources and greater technical expertise generated by
economic development facilitates the adoption and use  of IT systems  providing on-line
services which play an  important  role in reducing and simplifying procedures, an
example being the on-line one stop shop.
CONCLUSION – SCOPE FOR REFORM
The foregoing analysis shows significant variation in the burdens on the business sector
imposed by bureaucratic procedural regulations  within Southeast Asia. In some
countries,   the burden is light, viz. Singapore followed by Thailand and Malaysia. In
other countries (Laos, Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia and to some extent the
Philippines), bureaucratic procedures continue to weigh heavily upon private firms and
impede business activity. The former group of countries provide examples of what can
be done to reform bureaucratic procedures, which can provide precedents for the others
to follow.
One reform is to identify different regulatory procedures which draw upon  a large
amount of identical information. As mentioned above, the procedures could then be
conjoined either through the amalgamation of the administrative units responsible for
the procedures or by the automatic dissemination of such information once received to
the  other  responsible  agencies.  This  could  be  achieved  by    the  creation  of   a  central
processing agency based on the one stop shop (sometimes called one stop one stamp or
single access point)  concept (de Sa, 2005, 15-16). Such an agency   could itself be
responsible for issuing a range of related  licenses, permits and registrations, or by
combining the separate procedures where feasible,  granting simply one umbrella
approval subsuming different requirements.  Alternatively  it could disseminate  the
information it receives to other relevant agencies for the granting of permits, licenses
and registrations, and so act as a single access point feeding other agencies.   The
various procedures could be then undertaken simultaneously (IMF, 2004e, 13-14).
The one stop shop concept has been applied in Singapore with the BizFile on-line
facility mentioned earlier.  Even amongst  the countries in which the regulatory burden
is  still  excessive,   the  idea  has  found  favor.  In  Vietnam  it    has  been  applied   to  tax
administration and to most central government agencies at the provincial levels. In Laos
and Indonesia, new or proposed  investment and enterprise laws  have provide a
framework  for  the  one  stop   shop  arrangement,  whilst   in    Cambodia,  it  is  envisaged
that the Council for the Development of Cambodia  that oversees investment will
assume such a role (WB, 2004,  63, 79).
To   create an effective  one stop shop system depends on a thorough analysis to identify
in  what procedures there is a duplication and correspondence of information, and no
less,  a willingness of different agencies to overcome institutional rivalry and self-
protection,   permitting  the merging of functions and sharing of information. It is also
necessary to ensure that staff in the central processing agency are  competent enough
and see themselves as having the authority to make decisions in relation to various
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business functions (da Sa, 2005,  18-19). These requirements  though have hindered the
further  development    of  the  one  stop  shop   system  in  Vietnam.  One  businessman  in
Vietnam   has  stated  that  despite  the  implementation  of  the  one  stop  shop  system,
“businesses still have to go through too many doors” and that staff responsible in
provincial agencies practicing  the one stop shop approach “lack sufficient competence
to provide businesses with the appropriate guidance [and] tend to be rigid when dealing
with businesses” (VCCI, 2006, 2).
Equally important in reducing the burden imposed by bureaucratic procedures on
private firms is the introduction of on-line applications, processing and clearance. In
consequence, applications and information can be readily submitted by firms to
regulatory and licensing authorities, and clarification sought on how a procedure should
be followed. With the relevant software, applications can be quickly processed, and the
checks, verification, categorization and calculations can be done accurately with the
minimum of effort and time.  A related benefit of   an on-line system is to allow large
amounts of data to be stored and retrieved. This is invaluable in enabling not only
checks and verification, but in allowing the merger of   procedures which draw upon
similar or overlapping information  and in automatically disseminating information to
other agencies to enable them to undertake procedures for which they are responsible
simultaneously without further action by the firm.  Thus on-line systems are particularly
useful in establishing the one stop shop and single access point arrangement, and in
minimizing inconvenience, delays, costs  and arbitrary controls suffered by private
business in dealing with the public bureaucracy.
A key constraint impeding the advancement  of on-line systems is the  deficiency in
technical know-how and hardware capacity in the less developed countries of the region
(de Sa, 2005,18). In 2004,  the Cambodian government  announced its intention  to
adopt  an on-line system for customs clearance and trade data gathering, based on a
single interface between importers and customs officials, known as the Automated
System of Customs Data (ASYCUDA). As yet it  has not   been able to  implement it,
perhaps due to a lack of technical know-how and appropriate hardware capacity
(UNCTAD, 2007).  Equally important is a commitment to make best use of on-line
systems, when fully operational,  to reduce bureaucratic obstacles. Vietnam for example
has  used  a  variant  of  ASYCUDA  for  several  years,  yet  its  trade  facilitation  system  is
still characterized by  a maze of procedures, delays in clearances and the issue of
permits,  and substantial transaction costs for importers and exporters (see Table 2)
(UNCTAD, 2007). Lack of commitment may further explain Cambodia’s delay in
implementing ASYCUDA  since the minimizing of contact between importers and
officials reduces the opportunity for rent seeking.
Even without a one stop shop system, single access point and on-line processes, much
time could be saved by the simple expedient of switching from a sequential to a
simultaneous ordering of procedures wherever possible,  especially when  they are not
inter-dependent. Sequential ordering of procedures has significantly contributed to the
protraction of time in meeting bureaucratic requirements.
Another reform to  lighten the bureaucratic load upon business is to change where
appropriate from ex-ante  to ex-post controls. The business activity,  instead of being
stalled until all processes have been complete,  may be allowed on a provisional basis,
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during which time the firm concerned will be subject to the necessary procedures,
checks and inspections leading to    final approval or clearance (de Sa, 2005,  15). This
is exemplified by the ex-post or back-end customs clearance used by the Philippines
customs authority mentioned above.
Also  necessary in many  of the  countries of Southeast Asia is  a regulatory watchdog
or overseeing body which has  the power to vet each new regulation and procedure in
terms of  the extra  burdens imposed on business balanced against benefits to the
community and economy. The essential value of such a body would depend  on its
power to veto a proposed regulation or procedure where it has not been demonstrated
that the potential benefits outweigh the additional  burdens.  This prompted one
Vietnamese business leader to   propose a “an independent committee” before which
“regulators are required to prove the need and effectiveness of their regulations, [and] if
they fail, those regulations should be abolished” (VCCI, 2006a,  4). In fact, in Vietnam
one of  the implementing decrees currently being drafted under  the Enterprise Law of
2005, on state management of business licenses, proposes to create two regulatory
overseeing bodies:  National Council for Business Licenses,  based on one already
established in South Korea, and the Registration Office for Business Licenses. The first
of these bodies  will “oversee the procedures for business license issuance and to control
the quality of the licenses to ensure they are justified and effective.” The   second body
“would be responsible for ensuring that information on businesses licenses and
conditions is  transparent and easily accessible to businesses and the public.”  Within
this remit will be the power “to  review the current stock of businesses licenses and to
control the flow of new ones” (VCCI, 2006a,  4; de Sa, 2005,   19).
Equally important would be the creation of  an appeals system. This would enable
businesses collectively through their various associations to appeal against  a new but
potentially  burdensome and inconvenient regulatory procedure. Within such an  appeals
system there would exist  opportunities for individual firms to seek redress in the face of
adverse decisions, undue delay and additional and unnecessary costs. The power to
adjudicate in both cases could be vested in the regulatory overlord mentioned above.
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